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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PRESERVATION OF DUE PROCESS WREN Evi-
DENCE IS DESTROYED OR TESTED-State V. Wright, 87 Wn. 2d 783,
557 P.2d 1 (1976).
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the first degree murder
conviction of Andrew James Wright and dismissed the charges against
him on the ground that due process of law had been violated "by the
destruction of numerous items of material evidence prior to trial."1
The police officers who removed the body of the victim from the
room where it was discovered2 left several items behind, including
bedclothes which had been around and under the body and a man's
coat found on a chair next to the body.3 While Wright was in custody
but without counsel, the police gave Wright's stepfather permission to
destroy these items.4 Without checking for blood on any of the items,
the police destroyed the clothing which had been on the body, appar-
ently because of the risk that storage in available facilities would have
contaminated other evidence.5
More significant than the result in this case was the rule laid down
in the penultimate paragraph of the court's opinion6 requiring the
state to give notice to the defendant or to petition the court "before
any testing or disposition of evidence."7 State v. Wright, 87 Wn. 2d
783, 557 P.2d 1 (1976). The purpose of this note is to identify uncer-
1. State v. Wright, 87 Wn. 2d 783,783, 557 P.2d 1, 1-2 (1976).
2. A body alleged to be that of Wrights wife was found in the house where they
had lived. Id. at 784-85, 557 P.2d at 2-3.
3. Id. at 785-86, 557 P.2d at 3. Along with the coat, the items left in the room
included the "blanket, pillowcase, and sheet the body was wrapped in, the blanket and
mattress the body lay on, [and] the rugs and pillows on the floor." Id. at 785, 557
P.2d at 3.
4. Id. at 786, 557 P.2d at 3. "His purpose was to 'clean the room up"' for Wright's
great-grandmother, who owned the home. Id.
5. Id. at 785, 557 P.2d at 3.
The body, the surrounding bedclothes, and the bed were infested by maggots. As
the court noted, "The testimony at trial indicated it would have been necessary to
store the evidence in a small freezer in the [police] property room and that, if the
containing package broke, it would probably contaminate other evidence in the freezer."
Id.
Wrights attorney was informed of the destruction after requesting discovery of the
evidence removed from the room where the body was found and thereupon moved
for dismissal before trial. Id. at 786, 557 P.2d at 3.
6. The state moved for reconsideration and deletion of this paragraph. See Re-
spondent's Motion for Reconsideration of Decision [hereinafter cited as Respondents
Motion]. The petition for rehearing was denied on May 5, 1977. 87 Wn. 2d at 795.
7. 87 Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 7. The rule is fully set forth in the text accom-
panying note 37 infra.
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tainties in the future application of the Wright rule and to predict
their probable resolution. Analysis of Wright and the cases on which
it relies leads to the conclusion that failure to use the notice-petition
procedure before disposition or testing of evidence will result in sanc-
tions only if the defense can show that evidence destroyed, or chemi-
cally changed in testing, was potentially material, and only if the state
is unable to show that the failure to preserve was reasonable. In addi-
tion, the Wright rule implies a defense right to observe or participate
in potentially destructive tests and independently to test items which
are not consumed or whose chemical properties are not changed by
the tests. The choice of sanctions for violation of the rule will not be
limited to dismissal and will depend on the nature of the evidence in-
volved and its degree of materiality.
I. BACKGROUND: PRE-EXISTING LAW ON THE DUTY
TO PRESERVE
A. The Duty To Disclose
The duty to preserve material evidence recognized in Wright was
derived from the duty to disclose, which has both a constitutional and
a statutory basis. In Brady v. Maryland,8 the United States Supreme
Court imposed upon prosecutors an affirmative duty to disclose mate-
rial evidence. Brady held that due process is violated when, following
a request by the accused, the prosecution suppresses evidence which is
material to issues of guilt or punishment. Good or bad faith of the
prosecution was said to be irrelevant.9 The duty to disclose has been
8. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
9. Id. at 87. Brady builds on the foundation of Mooney v. Holohan, 292 U.S. 103,
112 (1935), and successor cases including Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942),
and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959), all cited in Brady, 373 U.S. at
86-87. These cases establish that due process is violated by state authorities' knowing
use of perjured testimony. Brady's rationale is that "[t] he principle of Mooney v.
Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of
an unfair trial to the accused." 373 U.S. at 87.
The Brady "rule" arguably is dictum because it is merely an explanation of why the
Court agreed with the Maryland Court of Appeals decision to grant a new trial on the
question of punishment. See Justice White's separate opinion, id. at 91-92. The ques-
tion presented by Brady's petition for certiorari was whether he was denied a federal
right when the Maryland court limited his retrial to the issue of punishment, id. at 85;
the United States Supreme Court ruled that he was not, id. at 90.
Nevertheless, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have treated the Brady disclosure
rule as precedent-for example, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and,
more recently, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). In Agurs, the issue was
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extended to situations in which no defense request, or only a general
request for anything exculpatory, was made.1 0 Some showing of mate-
riality is required, however, before nondisclosure results in sanc-
tions. 1
Rule 4.7 of the Washington Criminal Rules for Superior Court12
provides a statutory basis, in this state, for the prosecution's duty to
disclose material evidence to the defense. No later than the pretrial
omnibus hearing,' 3 the prosecutor must voluntarily disclose several
specific categories of information relevant to the offense charged.' 4
The rule also provides generally for disclosure by the prosecutor of
material or information within her knowledge which tends to excul-
pate the defendant.' 5 A specific request by the defendant for certain
other types of information imposes further duties on the prosecutor.' 6
whether the prosecution's failure to disclose information "deprived [the respondent]
of a fair trial under the rule of Brady v. Maryland." Id. at 98-99.
10. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The Agurs court reasoned
that "if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the
prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should equally arise even if no re-
quest is made." Id. at 107.
11. Id. at 103-13.
For suppression cases where actual materiality can be evaluated, Agurs identified
three different materiality standards: (1) A conviction obtained by knowing use of
false evidence "must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." Id. at 103. (2) "When the
prosecutor receives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response
is seldom, if ever, excusable." Id. at 106. The standard to be applied was left unclear,
though the Court stated that at least it must be shown that "the suppressed 6vidence
might have affected the outcome of the trial." Id. at 104. (3) Where there was no
request or only a general request for exculpatory evidence, the Court rejected the
"customary harmless error standard," holding that "if the omitted evidence creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed."
Id. at 1 12.
12. The rules were promulgated by the Washington Supreme Court pursuant to
WAsH. REv. CODE § 2.04.190 (1976).
13. The omnibus hearing is conducted pursuant to WASH. CRiM. R. SUPER. Cr. 4.5
in cases in which a plea of not guilty is entered. The parties ordinarily present all
motions or requests which they may have in preparation for trial or plea. The court
ascertains, among other things, whether there are any procedural or constitutional is-
sues which should be considered and determines the extent of discovery to be granted
to each party.
14. These include witnesses' and defendants' statements, experts' reports, real or
documentary evidence intended for use by the prosecution or obtained from the de-
fendant, and prior criminal records of defendants or intended witnesses. WAsH. CRIM.
R. SUPER. CT. 4.7(a)(1).
15. WASH. CRiM. R. SUPER. Cr. 4.7(a)(3).
16. WASH. CalM. R. SUPER. Cr. 4.7(c) provides,
Except as is otherwise provided as to matters not subject to disclosure the prose-
cuting attorney shall, upon request of the defendant, disclose any relevant material
and information regarding:
(1) specified searches and seizures;
(2) the acquisition of specified statements from the defendant; and
575
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The duty to produce is limited, however, to items and information
known, possessed, or controlled by the prosecutor's staff,17 although
she also has a duty, upon request, to "attempt to cause" certain items
or information held by other persons to be made available to the de-
fendant. 18
B. The Duty To Preserve
The duty to preserve derives from the duty to disclose and applies
to government loss or destruction of potential evidence. The extension
of the duty is logical, for if it applied " 'only when the exact content of
the non-disclosed materials was known, the disclosure duty would be
(3) the relationship, if any, of specified persons to the prosecuting authority.
The "matters not subject to disclosure" (relating to work product and informants) are
set forth in WASH. GRIM. R. SUPER. CT. 4.7(f).
The court has discretion to require further disclosures under WASH. CRIM. R. SUPER.
CT. 4.7(e)(1): "Upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense,
and if the request is reasonable, the court in its discretion may require disclosure to
the defendant of the relevant material and information not covered by sections (a), (c)
and (d)."
17. WASH. CRIM. R. SUPER. CT. 4.7(a)(4).
18. WASH. CRIM. R. SUPER. CT. 4.7(d) provides,
Upon defendant's request and designation of material or information in the
knowledge, possession or control of other persons which would be discoverable
if in the knowledge, possession or control of the prosecuting attorney, the prose-
cuting attorney shall attempt to cause such material or iiformation to be made
available to the defendant. If the prosecuting attorney's efforts are unsuccessful
and if such material or persons are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the
court shall issue suitable subpoenas or orders to cause such material to be made
available to the defendant.
Wright imposed duties to preserve and disclose in situations where actual prosecu-
tion control is much more tenuous than that required by Rule 4.7. See text accom-
panying notes 88-94 infra.
Analogous federal statutory provisions include FED. R. ClM. PRO. 16 and the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). Rule 16 provides for pretrial disclosure, upon request,
of statements made by the defendant and of documents and tangible objects which
are material to preparation of his defense. The Jencks Act provides that after a govern-
ment witness has testified, a defendant is entitled, upon request, to inspect all prior
statements of that witness insofar as they relate to his testimony. These federal provi-
sions are noteworthy here in that they have been partial grounds for federal court
decisions which were relied on by the Wright court, the most important of these being
United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971). That decision remanded the
case with directions to weigh the degree of negligence or bad faith, importance of the
evidence lost, and evidence of guilt adduced at trial. The convictions were affirmed on
remand, 448 F.2d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The two decisions should be read together,
because the second explains and supplements the first. The Wright court quotes the
phrase "pragmatic balancing approach" from the second Bryant decision, 448 F.2d at
1184, incorrectly citing to the first Bryant decision, 439 F.2d at 653. Wright, 87
Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 6. That phrase was the second Bryant court's description
of the weighing process it had mandated, in the decision before remand, for pre-
Bryant losses.
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an empty promise, easily circumvented by means of destruction rather
than mere failure to reveal.' "19
Destruction cases obviously differ from cases in which evidence
still in existence has been suppressed. In the latter, the materiality of
the evidence in question may be evaluated on appeal to determine
whether and to what extent the defendant was prejudiced by nondis-
closure. These cases have clearly established that even nondisclosure
which is merely negligent, and not in bad faith, may violate due pro-
cess if the evidence is sufficiently material.2 0 In determining whether
destruction or loss of evidence violated due process, however, deci-
sions by other courts prior to Wright have split: some emiphasize
"materiality" and purportedly ignore good or bad faith;21 others indi-
cate that bad faith destruction is a necessary criterion for due process
violation.22
19. 87 Wn. 2d at 788, 557 P.2d at 5 (quoting United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d
642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
Bryant may have been decided not only on constitutional grounds, but alternatively
on the basis of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), or FED. R. CRiM. PRo. 16.
439 F.2d at 647-50. The Wright court clearly uses Bryant as an application of the
Brady constitutional duty. 87 Wn. 2d at 789, 557 P.2d at 5. Accord, United States v.
Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
Bryant was relied on heavily by the Wright court and is a key to analyzing the impli-
cations of the Wright notice-petition rule. See note 18 supra.
20. E.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) ("If evidence highly
probative of innocence is in [the prosecutor's] file, he should be presumed to recognize
its significance even if he has actually overlooked it."); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (government failure to disclose promise of leniency made to
witness in exchange for testimony violated due process even though the U.S. attorney
who tried the case did not know of the promise). Both cases rely on Brady v. Mary-
land, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-107; Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151, 153.
21. Trimble v. State, 75 N.M. 183, 402 P.2d 165 (1965), a leading destruction
case using the suppression approach, cited Brady in explicitly rejecting the state's argu-
ment that because the loss of evidence was "negligent and not wilful, a different rule
applies." Id. at 183, 402 P.2d at 166. The Trimble court stressed the potential mate-
riality and usefulness of the missing evidence rather than the motives of the government
agent or the circumstances of the loss. The court may, however, have believed that
bad faith was involved in that case, because it characterized the defendant's reluctance
to claim bad faith as "indeed charitable." Id. at 183, 402 P.2d at 165.
22. E.g., United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 355-56 (1969) (government
loss of a tape recording of an interview with the prime government witness was not
constitutional error, though it may have been a violation of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3500 (1970)). The Augenblick Court noted that the government had made "an
earnest effort.., to locate" the tape. Id. at 355.
Another example is United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973), which reversed an order suppressing results of a blood
test showing defendant's blood alcohol level, even though the blood sample had been
thrown out by a technician who had found that his refrigerator was full and had not
realized that the sample should be preserved. 468 F.2d at 237. The court in Sewar
interpreted Augenblick to mean that evidence is not "suppressed" when lost in good
faith and that such a case does not involve constitutional error. Id. at 238.
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Cases which extend the duty to preserve and disclose to parties
other than the prosecutor augment the idea that bad faith by the pro-
secutor is not a criterion for due process violation. The Supreme
Court has suggested that the prosecutor is responsible for all informa-
tion available to a member of his staff.23 Most cases also extend the
duty to disclose to the police of the prosecuting jurisdiction. 24
II. REASONING OF THE WRIGHT COURT
In determining whether defendant Wright was denied due process,
the Washington Supreme Court first rejected the approach utilized in
cases involving government failure to disclose still-existing evidence.
Such a distinction is proper because when the evidence sought in dis-
covery no longer exists, the court is "unable to determine whether
some or all of the evidence would have been favorable to the defen-
dant and material to the issue of guilt or innocence. '"25 The court then
recognized and seemingly adopted the approach of United States v.
Bryant2 6 and People v. Hitch27 in holding that the duty to disclose is
operative before trial as a duty to preserve. 28 The duty was said to
"apply equally to the prosecution, police, other investigatory agen-
cies, and persons who handle evidence with the consent of such offi-
cials." 29
Again following Bryant and Hitch, the Wright court held that evi-
23. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). For the holding of Giglio, see
note 20 supra. The Court stated,
[W] hether the nondisclosure was a result of negligence or design, it is the respon-
sibility of the prosecutor.... To the extent this places a burden on large prosecu-
tion offices, procedures and regulations can be established to carry that burden
and to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to every
lawyer who deals with it.
405 U.S. at 154.
24. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1271
(4th ed. 1974). E.g., Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding that
"[t] he police are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less if
they rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure."). Although
Barbee is a suppression case, United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
applies the principle to destruction cases: 'The duty of disclosure affects not only the
prosecutor, but the Government as a whole, including its investigative agencies." Id.
at 650.
25. 87 Wn. 2d at 788, 557 P.2d at 4.
26. 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cited in Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 788-89,
791-92, 557 P.2d at 5-7.
27. 12 Cal. 3d 641, 650, 527 P.2d 361, 367, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 15 (1974), cited in
Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 789, 791-92, 557 P.2d at 5-7.
28. 87 Wn. 2d at 789, 557 P.2d at 5.
29. ld. at 790 n.4, 557 P.2d at 6 n.4.
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dence is sufficiently material to bring a case within the protection of
the due process clause when there is a "reasonable possibility" that it
was material to guilt or innocence and favorable to the appellant.30
To determine whether that standard was met in Wright, the court re-
viewed the entire record, considering not only the evidence of guilt
but also evidence favorable to the defense. 31 According to the court,
the defendant met the reasonable possibility standard by enumerating
"areas where the existence of the evidence destroyed could possibly
have been of assistance to him. '3 2 Finally, while conceding that "good
30. Id. at 789-90, 557 P.2d at 5-6 (citing United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642
(D.C. Cir. 1971), and People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr.
9 (1974)).
31. 87 Wn. 2d at 789, 557 P.2d at 5-6 (citing In re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 533,
487 P.2d 1234, 1240, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 600 (1971)).
Although the body, which had been dead two to three weeks, was found by police
in the house where the Wrights had lived, it was in a room separate from their living
quarters. 87 Wn. 2d at 784-86, 557 P.2d at 3-4. Facts not clearly proven at Wright's
trial included the body's identity, the date of the killing, and the place of death. More
importantly, evidence on whether the bullets in the body were fired from the defend-
ant's gun was conflicting, and the presence of a circular chest wound along with three
bullet wounds made the cause of death uncertain. Id. at 786, 557 P.2d at 4.
The court conceded that "there was evidence from which a jury could infer the de-
fendant had, in fact, committed the crime." Id. Along with the questionable evidence
that the bullets in the body were fired from Wright's gun, there was testimony that
before the body was found Wright "had told his employer his wife had been killed in
an automobile accident," id. at 784, 557 P.2d at 3, and that while "Kathleen had not
been to work for approximately 3 weeks ... appellant had been forging and cashing
payroll checks." Id.
A reading of the majority and concurring opinions together suggests that persons
other than the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime, most notably Mrs.
Kupoff, Wright's great-grandmother and the owner of the house, and Dale Morbeck,
who had formerly occupied the room where the body was found. Mrs. Kupoff stated
for the first time at trial that she had found the body on October 21, 1974, though
the police did not discover it until November 21, when it was badly decomposed. She
had access to Wright's gun and admitted returning the gun to the place where it was
kept after finding the bpdy. Morbeck had keys to the room in which the body was
found and to the building at the time of the killing. The coat found in the room was
his. Morbeck had owned a knife which he claimed to have lost at the time of the kill-
ing, and the autopsy indicated that the cause of death could have been a stab wound.
Id. at 790, 557 P.2d at 6 (majority opinion); id. at 794-95, 557 P.2d at 8 (concurring
opinion).
32. 87 Wn. 2d at 790, 557 P.2d at 6; see note 31 supra.
Discovery of blood on Morbeck's coat could have implicated him in the killing; if
a knife had been found in the coat it might have proven to be a murder weapon; the
amount of dirt, oil, mud, or other substances on the shoes, clothing, or items in which
the body was wrapped could have helped determine the location of the killing-whether
in the room where the body was found, some other room, or outside the house; the
absence or presence of blood on the sheet or blanket in which the body was wrapped
could have helped indicate whether she was killed with or without the sheet or blanket
around her; ownership of the material in which the body was wrapped might have
been established by a laundry mark or other identifying mark; examination of clothing
and shoes could have been helpful in identifying the body; blood other than that of
the deceased and of a type dissimilar to defendants might have been found on the
deceased's clothing. Id. at 790-91, 557 P.2d at 6.
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faith loss" might excuse noncompliance with the duty of preservation
if the government made "earnest efforts" to preserve crucial materi-
als,33 the court determined that no effort to preserve the evidence was
made in this case.34
The court then considered the question of appropriate sanctions in
destruction cases, concluding that the choice of sanctions should be
"guided by the 'pragmatic balancing approach,' enunciated in
[Bryant] ."35 Using the balancing approach, the court ordered rever-
sal and dismissal because there had been a serious violation of due
process and a new trial would do nothing to remedy the constitutional
violation.3 6
The penultimate paragraph of the majority opinion stated that the
decision required preservation of all potentially material and favor-
able evidence. Noting the difficulties in identifying all such evidence
at the scene of a crime and in preserving all potential evidence, the
court laid down the following rule to alleviate these problems:
[B] efore any testing or disposition of evidence occurs, the defendant
should be given notice of the type of evidence involved and its
planned disposition. If contact with the defendant is impossible or if
the defendant is not yet represented by counsel, the state must petition
the trial court which will determine an appropriate course of action
consistent with the interests of both the prosecution and defense.37
III. FUTURE APPLICATION OF THE WRIGHT RULE
A. Operation of the Notice-Petition Procedure
The court did not elaborate on how the existence of a procedure
for notice to the defendant or petition to the court before disposition
or testing would change the duty to preserve. The notice-petition rule
33. Id. at 791, 557 P.2d at 6 (emphasis in original) (citing United States v. Bry-
ant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 652,
527 P.2d 361, 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 17 (1974)).
34. 87 Wn. 2d at 791-92, 557 P.2d at 6-7.
35. Id. at 792, 557 P.2d at 7 (quoting Bryant, 448 F.2d 1182, 1184 (D.C. Cir.
1971), but incorrectly citing 439 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). See note 18 supra.
The balancing approach is said to require "a weighing of 'the degree of negligence
or bad faith involved, the importance of the evidence lost, and the evidence of guilt
adduced at trial in order to come to a determination that will serve the ends of jus-
tice.' " 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7 (quoting Bryant, 439 F.2d at 653).
36. 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7.
37. Id.at 793,557 P.2d at 7.
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is apparently derived from two sources: Circuit Judge Merrill's con-
curring opinion in United States v. Heiden38 and a Columbia Law Re-
view note39 which adopts and supplements Judge Merrill's sugges-
tion.40 These sources reveal that notice before disposition of evidence
has the dual purpose of providing the defendant an "opportunity to
petition for access to [evidence] which has been seized," 41 and reduc-
ing evidence maintenance by police to a manageable level.42 A defen-
dant could prevent destruction by requesting discovery of some or all
of the evidence involved, but if he agreed to destruction or failed to
request discovery, he would probably be held to have waived any
claim that the destruction was a violation of due process.43
Uncertainties about future application of the Wright notice-petition
rule led the state to request that the court delete the penultimate para-
graph of the opinion, because the rule would be unduly burdensome
38. 508 F.2d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 1974) (concurring opinion), cited in Wright, 87
Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 7.
The concurring opinion states, "When... destruction is shown to have been prej-
udicial, reversal is called for .... I would urge that ... destruction of evidence fol-
low only after petition and order directed to the particular items to be destroyed, with
notice to the defendant and opportunity to petition for access to that which has been
seized." 508 F.2d at 903.
In Heiden, all but 24 kilo packages of a large marijuana seizure had been destroyed
because of contraband storage problems. Id. at 902. The court refused to reverse
the conviction, because the destruction was not prejudicial. Id. at 900-01, 903. Never-
theless, both the opinion of the court, id. at 903 n.1, and Judge Merrill's concurrence,
id. at 903, strongly disapproved of the destruction, because of the potential for prejudice.
39. Note, The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservation of
Evidence Doctrine, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1355 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Testing],
cited in Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 7.
40. Testing, supra note 39, at 1377-80.
41. United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d at 903 (concurring opinion).
42. Testing, supra note 39, at 1378.
Judge Merrill's suggestion was partially a response to the contraband storage prob-
lems which were the reason for the Heiden destruction discussed in note 38 supra.
Reduction of evidence maintenance is clearly a purpose of the Wright rule: its hold-
ing that a claim of inadequate facilities will not justify destruction unless facilities
could not be obtained, 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7, is footnoted with the state-
ment: 'The burden imposed by this rule is greatly minimized by the procedure for
notice to the defendant and petition to the court which we adopt for use in the future."
Id. at 792 n.5, 557 P.2d at 7 n.5.
43. According to the Columbia Law Review note, the notice "should indicate a
reasonable time period in which the defendant must exercise his rights of access."
Testing, supra note 39, at 1380.
The petition-to-the-court requirement in the event that the defendant is unrepre-
sented or contact with him is impossible is also taken directly from the Columbia Law
Review note. Compare Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 7, with Testing, supra
note 39, at 1380. The intent is that the court "oversee-or at least recognize the oc-
currence" of the testing or disposition, the purpose being "simply to draw the individual
... into the process at the earliest conceivable moment." Id. at 1378.
581
Washington Law Review
and unworkable. 44 It is unclear after Wright when failure to use the
notice-petition procedure prior to disposition or testing requires sanc-
tions, and how those sanctions are to be chosen. Specifically, Wright
leaves the following issues open: (1) What degree of materiality, if
any, is necessary for destruction of evidence to result in a due process
violation? (2) When, if ever, can failure to preserve material evidence
be excused? (3) What is the extent of a defendant's rights with respect
to testing? (4) How is the choice of sanctions for violation of the duty
to preserve to be determined? The remainder of this section analyzes
these questions.
B. Materiality Requirement
1. Prerequisite to the duty to preserve
The initial issue is whether the defense must make any showing of
materiality before destruction of evidence will result in sanctions. Ar-
guably, United States v. Bryant45 mandates automatic dismissal for
noncompliance with its requirement that preservation rules be pro-
mulgated and enforced, 46 even without a showing that the evidence
44. Respondent's Motion, supra note 6, at 3-11.
The prosecutor had four main complaints: (1) The rule could be interpreted to re-
quire that investigating officers notify suspects or obtain court permission before ter-
mination of a crime scene investigation. Respondent's Motion, supra at 3. But see
Part III-C-1 infra. (2) The rule could "require judicial approval before stolen prop-
erty can be returned to its true owner even if no suspect has been identified and there
is no reasonable expectation that the property will be destroyed." Respondent's Motion,
supra at 7. But see Parts III-B and III-C-4 infra. (3) The rule could "require notice
to a suspect or judicial approval prior to such routine field investigation techniques
as dusting for fingerprints" or "field testing" for the presence of unlawful drugs. Re-
spondent's Motion, supra at 8. But see Part III-D infra. (4) The rule could "require
prior judicial approval for the thousands of tests conducted in crime laboratories even
though the normal testing procedures would neither destroy, consume or render the
item of evidence incapable of being subsequently tested." Respondent's Motion, supra
at 10. But see Part III-D infra.
45. 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 197 1). See note 18 supra.
46. In the Bryant decisions, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the "pragmatic balancing approach." Id. at 652-53; 448 F.2d 1182, 1184 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (discussed at note 35 supra). See note 18 supra. For future cases, however,
the court laid down a prospective rule:
[S] anctions for nondisclosure based on loss of evidence will be invoked ... unless
the Government can show that it has promulgated, enforced and attempted in
good faith to follow rigorous and systematic procedures designed to preserve all
discoverable evidence gathered in the course of a criminal investigation.... Negli-
gent failure to comply with the required procedures will provide no excuse.
439 F.2d at 652 (emphasis in original).
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lost would have been material and favorable to the defendant's case.4 7
The Wright court relied heavily on Bryant48 and Wright's notice-peti-
tion requirement arguably parallels the Bryant court's rulemaking
and enforcement requirement. 49 This position could be justified on
the ground that the state would not rigorously follow the notice-peti-
tion procedure without the threat of sanctions. 50 The Washington
court, however, will surely require a defense showing of materiality
under Wright. The court might not accept the interpretation of Bryant
just discussed, that is, it might not read Bryant as requiring automatic
dismissal for noncompliance with the rule promulgation and enforce-
ment mandate.51 Decisions of several other courts claiming to follow
Bryant still require a showing of materiality.52 Alternatively, the court
47. On remand in Bryant, see note 18 supra, there was agent testimony that there
had been a rule requiring preservation of the tape recording involved, but that the
recording had been "almost completely unintelligible." 448 F.2d 1182, 1184 n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). The court held that, under the balancing approach, no sanction would be
applied, but that in the future such conduct "would surely result in the imposition of
full sanctions": "[I] nvestigative agencies will not be allowed to excuse nonpreserva-
tion of evidence by claiming that it contained nothing of interest to defendants." Id.
at 1184. "It is the defendant's right to discover such evidence and decide for himself
its usefulness." Id. at 1184 n. 1.
48. Bryant is cited in Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 788-89, 791-92, 557 P.2d at 5-7.
Wright also cites United States v. Perry, 471 F.2d 1057, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1972), in its
discussion of sanctions. 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7. The Perry court again ap-
plied the balancing approach, but noted that a different standard was to be applied to
losses occurring after the Bryant decision. 471 F.2d at 1065 n.35. See notes 46-47
supra.
49. Wright recognized Bryant's preservation-rules requirement and specifically left
open the question whether it would require promulgation of such rules sometime in
the future: "It is desirable that our consideration of such a rule be informed by exten-
sive briefing by the parties and others interested and such is not available to us here."
87 Wn. 2d at 789 n.3, 557 P.2d at 5 n.3.
50. See Comment, Judicial Response to Governmental Loss or Destruction of Evi-
dence, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 542, 562-63 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Governmental
Loss].
51. See United States v. Quiovers, 539 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Quiovers held
that, unless the loss of evidence is deliberate or results from the agency's failure to
prescribe adequate preservation rules, Bryant requires dismissal only "where there is a
substantial likelihood of serious prejudice to the defendant". Id. at 746-47.
The court in Quiovers admitted that the second Bryant decision, 448 F.2d 1182(D.C. Cir. 1971), could be taken as requiring automatic dismissal for negligent non-
preservation, but held that it does not. 539 F.2d at 747 n.4. The distinction between
the pre- and post-Bryant standards, according to Quiovers, ii that lack of bad faith is
not to be weighed as an excusing factor for post-Bryant losses. Id. at 746-47. Quiovers
claims to reiterate "Bryant's teaching that the total circumstances must be considered
in determining what sanction to apply." Id. at 747.
52.' For example, the court in United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.
1976), while citing Bryant, id. at 1252, and admitting that the FBI has a duty to pre-
serve original notes from interviews with prospective witnesses or with the accused,
held that the trial judge's refusal to strike an FBI agent's testimony concerning his
interview with the accused was "harmless error" because the defendant made no claim
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might disregard Bryant entirely on this issue. It is unlikely that the
court intends that sanctions be applied blindly without considering
the materiality of evidence lost. Justice Wright's concurring state-
ment, joined by four other justices, shows that the majority of the
court is opposed to "freeing ...obviously guilty persons on purely
technical grounds." 53
Requiring a showing of materiality is sensible because preventing
"subversion of the truth-finding process"54 is the real purpose of the
Wright rule, and that purpose is achieved when the duty to preserve
applies only to material evidence. Law enforcement agencies have
sufficient incentive to use the notice-petition procedure because of the
risk that a court may find that the evidence destroyed, or changed by
testing, was potentially material and that the agency personnel should
have anticipated materiality.55
2. Degree of materiality required
In Wright, the evidence destroyed was found to be sufficiently
material to invoke sanctions because there was a "reasonable possibil-
ity that the evidence destroyed ... was material to guilt or innocence
and favorable to appellant." 56 The reasonable possibility standard is
justified because even when destroyed evidence would have been ex-
culpatory, it is impossible in many cases for the accused to state factu-
that the agent lied or that his written report was incomplete or inaccurate. Id. at 1253.
See also People v. Wright, 60 Cal. App. 3d 6, 15, 131 Cal. Rptr. 311, 317-18
(1976). In that case, the police officer had used a tape recording of an interview with
the defendant as the basis for his report, and then erased the tape in accord with his
usual practice. The court found no due process violation because the defendant could
have made the testimonial assertion that he had made statements inconsistent with
those attributed to him by the cross-examiner, but did not. The court held that when
the loss or destruction does not involve bad faith, the defendant must make a showing
of substantial materiality, at least where "[s] uch a showing was not beyond his means."
Id. at 16, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 318. People v. Wright was decided under the rule of People
v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974), which is cited in
Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 789, 791-92, 557 P.2d at 5, 7, and which relied heavily on Bry-
ant. See Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 647-62, 527 P.2d at 366-69, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 14-17.
Accord, Hale v. State, 248 Ind. 630, 230 N.E.2d 432, 435 (1967) (stating that in all
cases the court had found in which negligent destruction resulted in reversal, either
"materiality was self-evident or a showing of materiality was prevented by the destruc-
tion.").
53. 87 Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 8 (concurring opinion).
54. Id. at 788, 557 P.2d at 5.
55. See Part III-C-1 infra.
56. 87 Wn. 2d at 789-90, 557 P.2d at 6.
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ally. what the evidence would have demonstrated.57 In Wright,
therefore, mere hypothesis by the defense of ways in which the de-
stroyed evidence might have affirmatively pointed to someone else as
the perpetrator of the crime satisfied the reasonable possibility stan-
dard. 58
The issue left open after Wright is how directly relevant -evidence
must be to invoke the duty of preservation.5 9 The decision, together
with others, supports a rule that the duty applies whenever a reason-
able possibility exists that the evidence destroyed or altered would
have cast doubt on the defendant's guilt by tending to point to some-
one else as the perpetrator of the crime,60 by tending to support an af-
firmative defense, 61 by tending to corroborate a crucial part of the de-
fendant's version of facts showing his innocence, 62 or by tending to
impeach prosecution evidence. 63 Although there is authority to the ef-
fect that potential usefulness for the defense in obtaining further evi-
57. See People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974),
cited in Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 789, 557 P.2d at 5.
58. 87 Wn. 2d at 790-91, 557 P.2d at 6. Potential exculpatory value of the evi-
dence destroyed in Wright is discussed in notes 31-32 supra. Other cases holding that
bad faith in nondisclosure need not be shown are cited in note 69 infra.
A showing of bad faith in destruction may be said to establish a conclusive presump-
tioni of materiality. See, e.g., People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 653 n.7, 527 P.2d 361,
370 n.7, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 18 n.7 (1974); Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 791-92, 557 P.2d at
6-7. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (strict standard of ma-
teriality to be applied in cases which "involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function
of the trial process").
59. The inquiry might be, for example, whether the claimed potential relevance of
destroyed evidence is "crucial to the question of... guilt." United States v. Bryant,
439 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Bryant court found that, at least when that
standard is met, the constitutional issue is raised. Id.
60. Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 790-91, 557 P.2d at 6. See notes 31-32 supra.
61. See, e.g., Trimble v.'State, 75 N.M. 179, 402 P..2d 160, 165 (1965) (accused
claimed that evidence lost by police would have corroborated his claim of self-defense).
62. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Fettig, 10 Wn. App. 773, 519 P.2d 1002 (1974)
(man accused of driving while intoxicated claimed that negligently destroyed video
tape would have shown his sobriety), cited in Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 787, 557 P.2d at 4.
63. See, e.g., People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9
(1974). The holding in Hitch was seemingly endorsed by Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 789-90,
557 P.2d at 5-6.
Hitch can be said to stand for the proposition that evidence may be sufficiently
material without being "crucial" to guilt. Hitch found that destruction of test and
reference ampoules used in breathalyzer tests to determine blood alcohol content vio-
lated due process, because the destroyed evidence could have been used to "impeach
the accuracy and credibility of the results of the test." 12 Cal. 3d at 649, 527 P.2d at
367, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Future preservation was ordered even though under the
substantive law one could be convicted of drunk driving without evidence of a breath-
alyzer or other chemical test. Id. at 653, 527 P.2d at 370, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 18. The
sanction for destruction, however, is merely to be suppression of the test results, rather
than automatic dismissal. Id. at 654, 527 P.2d at 370, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
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dence64 makes the duty to preserve operative,65 this ground alone
should not suffice. The defense should be required to show in addition
a "reasonable possibility" that the further evidence would have been
useful in one of the four ways listed above.66
The contention that destroyed evidence is sufficiently material
when it is relevant only to the reasonableness of a search, but not to
guilt,67 should and probably will be rejected because the purpose of
the Wright rule is "to prevent the subversion of the truth-finding pro-
cess."
6 8
C. Excuse for Failure To Preserve Material Evidence
When the failure to preserve material evidence can be excused is
another issue left unclear by Wright. The absence of bad faith is
clearly not enough by itself to excuse nonpreservation. 69 Nevertheless,
the court in Wright did concede that "good faith loss may excuse non-
64. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 74 (1967) (plurality opinion).
65. According to United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), this
kind of potential use is "a component of the constitutional analysis recognized in
Giles v. Maryland." Bryant, 439 F.2d at 648 n.10 (citing Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 74 (1967) (plurality opinion)). Accord, United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421
(D.C. Cir. 1975). In Harrison, the court held that rough notes from any witness in-
terview with law enforcement officials could prove to be Brady material, and are
therefore to be preserved under Bryant, because "the notes could contain substantive
information or leads which would be of use to the defendants on the merits of the
case." Id. at 427.
66. Cf. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (involving suppression but not
destruction of evidence, where no request, or only a general request for exculpatory
evidence, was made). 'The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information
might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does
not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense." Id. at 109-10. Agurs is discussed
at note 11 supra.
67. United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1974), leaves open the possi-
bility that sufficient prejudice may result from destruction when the evidence is not
crucial to guilt at all but only relevant to whether other evidence should be suppressed
because a search was unreasonable. Id. at 903.
68. 87 Wn. 2d at 788, 557 P.2d at 5.
69. The Wright court noted that "[u] nder the rule governing suppression of evi-
dence, the circumstances surrounding the nondisclosure, including the motivation of
the party responsible for the suppression, are irrelevant. See, e.g., Jackson v. Wain-
wright, 390 F.2d 288, 295 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Consolidated Laundries
Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1961)." 87 Wn. 2d at 787, 557 P.2d at 4. The court
asserted that because destruction cases "are closely analogous, the motive of those
destroying the items is not determinative." Id. at 791, 557 P.2d at 7. The rationale is
that the "purpose of the duty of preservation is not to punish the police but to insure
a fair trial for the accused." Id. (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
Motive in destruction may, however, be relevant to the determination of materiality.
See note 58 supra.
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compliance with the duties of preservation and disclosure where the
government makes 'earnest efforts' to preserve crucial materials. 7 0
The court's definition of "earnest efforts" remains uncertain. On
the one hand, its reliance on Bryant and Hitch indicates that "[in] egli-
gent failure to comply with the required procedures will provide no
excuse."17 On the other hand, Wright clearly mandates that a failure
to preserve material evidence is reasonable if the notice-petition pro-
cedure has been used.72 The remaining question is whether reason-
able, non-negligent failure to comply with the notice-petition proce-
dure will be excused when there is a reasonable possibility that
evidence destroyed was material.73
Assuming that under some circumstances failure to preserve could
be excused as reasonable without use of the notice-petition procedure,
the state would have the burden of showing that an excuse should be
recognized.7 4 Conceivably, excuses for failure to preserve could in-
70. 87 Wn. 2d at 791, 557 P.2d at 6 (emphasis in original) (citing United States
v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641,
652, 527 P.2d 361, 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 17 (1974)).
Bryant derived the "earnest efforts" standard from dictum in United States v. Augen-
blick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969), in which the Court noted that government agents had
testified on their "routine in handling" the type of evidence lost and that the govern-
ment had made "an earnest effort ... to locate" the evidence. Id. at 355, cited
in Bryant, 439 F.2d at 651-52. Although Augenblick did not explicitly require "earn-
est efforts," the Bryant court suggests that it requires the government to make" 'earnest
efforts' to preserve crucial materials and to find them once a discovery request is
made." 439 F.2d at 651.
71. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971), quoted in People
v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 652, 527 P.2d 361, 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 17 (1974). Bryant
defined earnest efforts "stritily" so that the exception for good faith loss would not
"swallow the discovery rules." 439 F.2d at 651-52.
72. See notes 38-43 and accompanying text supra.
Also note that under both United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
and People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974), the earnest
efforts standard is met and a nonmalicious loss may thereby be excused if the agency
has made a good faith attempt to enforce adequate preservation rules. Bryant, 439
F.2d at 652; Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 652-53, 527 P.2d at 369, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
73. United States v. Perry, 471 F.2d 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cited in Wright, 87
Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7, holds that while the government duty to preserve, as
enunciated in United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d at 652-53, is a heavy one, it is not
"an absolute duty." 471 F.2d at 1066. It is unclear, however, whether that qualification
merely refers to the fact that materiality is prerequisite to due process violation, or
whether it means that there can be a reasonable failure to preserve material evidence.
74. Under United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the burden is
on the government to produce the evidence requested or explain why it cannot. Id. at
651 (citing United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348, 355-56 (1969)). This modifies
Augenblick, in which the Court found that the "burden" was met when the govern-
ment explained that it could not produce the evidence because "no one knew where it
was or what had happened to it," 393 U.S. at 354; that is, loss was a sufficient explana-
tion for failure to produce.
One commentator suggests logically that the defendant should have an initial bur-
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clude (1) reasonable failure to anticipate potential materiality; (2) rea-
sonable failure to prevent destruction by private persons; (3) reason-
able failure to preserve caused by administrative inconvenience; (4)
reasonable substitution for actual preservation. Each possibility will
be analyzed to predict the likelihood of future acceptance by the court
acting under the Wright rule.
1. Failure to anticipate potential materiality
The Wright notice-petition rule might not excuse reasonable failure
to anticipate materiality,75 because one of its purposes is to alleviate
the problems involved in recognizing materiality at a crime scene.76
Such an excuse is also negated by the court's statement that "neither
the police nor the prosecution are to decide for the defense what is fa-
vorable or material evidence." 77 The court stated that " 'there is no
exception for good faith administrative decisions that certain evidence
is not discoverable and thus need not be preserved.' "78 The
" 'imbalance in investigative resources' 79 which favors the govern-
ment and the need to insure reliability in the trial process 80 may be
den of showing the prior existence of the evidence requested unless he can "describe
specifically the evidence he is seeking"; in that case, the government should have the
burden of showing its "prior nonexistence." Governmental Loss, supra note 50, at
565.
75. This is the prime fear expressed in the state's brief requesting deletion of
Wright's notice-or-petition rule: "Many times an item near the scene will have no ap-
parent relevance to any reasonable theory of the criminal investigation .... Yet such
an item may later be considered material and favorable to a defense theory at trial,
particularly an affirmative defense such as self-defense or diminished capacity." Re-
spondent's Motion, supra note 6, at 5.
In its brief, the state hypothesizes a situation in which a partially filled bottle of
liquor found in the same room with a homicide victim has no apparent relevance and
thus is not noted in official reports, tested for fingerprints, or placed in evidence. If a
defendant later "claims to have been so intoxicated that he could not form any crim-
inal intent, the presence of that liquor bottle, the amount remaining in it and whether
or not the defendant's fingerprints were on it are obviously material and potentially
favorable to the defense." The state asked if it was to be held responsible for failure
to preserve if the landlord disposes of the bottle after the crime scene investigation
has been terminated. Id. at 5-6.
For a discussion of destruction by private persons, see Part III-C-2 infra.
76. 87 Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 7.
77. Id. at 787, 557 P.2d at 4 (citing Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 845 (4th
Cir. 1964), and Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1950)).
78. 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7 (quoting United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d
642, 652 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
79. 87 Wn. 2d at 788, 557 P.2d at 5 (quoting United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d
642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
80. The Wright court quoted Bryant for the proposition that the purpose of the
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said to call for a standard of "perfect anticipation of possible eventu-
alities." 81
Conversely, Wright's recognition of the difficulty in recognizing
and preserving every piece of potential evidence,8 2 along with its
pragmatic balancing approach, may indicate that the court would ex-
cuse a reasonable failure to recognize materiality, especially jf materi-
ality is minimal. 83 Excusing such failure is not only consistent with
the approach of other courts,8 4 but is required by the interest in effi-
cient administration of justice.85 Defense interests are sufficiently pro-
duty to disclose is to "'make of the trial a search for truth informed by all relevant
material.'" 87 Wn. 2d at 788, 557 P.2d at 5 (quoting Bryant, 439 F.2d at 648).
81. Brief of Amicus Curiae Opposing Motion for Reconsideration of Decision at
7 (asserting that the authorities need not be held to such a standard under Wright).
See note 6 supra.
The amicus brief was responding to the apparent assumption by the state in its mo-
tion seeking deletion of the Wright notice-petition rule that the rule would hold police
to a standard of perfect anticipation. See Respondent's Motion, supra note 6, at 3-7.
82. 87 Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 7.'The Columbia Law Review note cited in
Wright, id., calls the Bryant requirement that the prosecution preserve all discoverable
evidence "troublesome" because of these difficulties. Testing, supra note 39, at 1375.
83. The authors of the amicus brief opposing the state's motion to delete the
notice-petition requirement asserted that Wright's recognition of these difficulties shows
that "[t] he Court was not suggesting that law enforcement authorities would have to
acquire and preserve all things that would help any possible defendant, only that it
would be nice if it fsic] could." They contend that "preservation of all potentially ma-
terial and favorable evidence," 87 Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 7, is only "the ideal
towards which" the court intended the "practical rule" in Wright to aim. Brief of Amicus
Curiae Opposing Motion for Reconsideration of Decision at 7.
The amicus brief further stated,
Law enforcement authorities would still have the right to make an initial deter-
mination as to the value of things as evidence and destroy or leave at the scene
things that they are convinced are useless. With respect to objects or documents,
the evidentiary value of which is not even contemplated at the time of the initial
investigation, there can be no burden on the investigator because perfect anticipa-
tion is not possible.
Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
84. E.g., Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cited in Wright,
87 Wn. 2d at 787, 557 P.2d at 4 (for its definition of materiality). Griffin holds that
disclosure is necessary when evidence may "reasonably be considered useful and nec-
essary to the defense" and that the prosecution is not to decide for the defense what
is useful, "[w] hen there is substantial room for doubt." 183 F.2d at 993 (emphasis
added). That approach could be used to suggest, for example, that when the prosecu-
tion shows that the police had no reason to suspect an item could be useful for the
defense, failure to preserve should be excused. Accord, State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz.
348, 464 P.2d 793, 797-98, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970) (no negligence and thus
no due process violation was found because the agent discarding an item had no reason
to know it could be used to help support the defendant's claim of self-defense).
85. The state's brief requesting deletion of the notice-petition rule asserted that
law enforcement authorities should be allowed to destroy or leave at the scene things
they reasonably believe to be useless. Otherwise, claimed the state, in situations when
contact with the defendant is not possible or the defendant is not yet represented by
counsel, the risk of violating the rule could be avoided only by requesting "a judge
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tected so long as the court demands a very strong showing by the pro-
secution 86 of reasonableness in the failure to anticipate potential
materiality. Fear that a court will find that the state should have antic-
ipated materiality will provide incentive for caution to law enforce-
ment officials. Moreover, the inference that destroyed evidence was
actually and substantially exculpatory is weaker when failure to rec-
ognize potential materiality is reasonable than when it is either negli-
gent or in bad faith. 87
2. Destruction by private persons
Another potential excuse for failure to preserve is destruction by
private persons without prior police or prosecution permisson. Among
those to whom the duty to preserve applies, Wright includes "persons
who handle evidence with the consent of" law enforcement offi-
cials.88 One rationale for the duty to preserve is that much of the rele-
vant material " 'will be exclusively in the hands of the Govern-
ment.' "89 But this rationale does not apply where the government has
never acquired the evidence and it is destroyed without its consent.90
Nevertheless, Wright may imply a duty to acquire material
to come to the scene of the investigation and make a determination, before the scene
is abandoned, that 'all potentially material and favorable evidence' . . . has been pre-
served and not disposed of." Respondent's Motion, supra note 6, at 7 (quoting Wright,
87 Wn. 2d at 793, 557 P.2d at 7 (emphasis in Wright)).
The state's brief claims that the result would be the conversion of the common law
magistrate "as a neutral determiner of matters brought before him into an investiga-
tory magistrate" of the civil law type. Respondent's Motion, supra at 7.
86. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
87. The approach of the Wright court shows that a defendant need not show actual
exculpatory value. Bearing that in mind, the more unreasonable a failure to anticipate
materiality seems in retrospect, the more likely it is that materiality was recognized,
even though the defense may not be able to prove bad faith.
88. 87 Wn. 2d at 790 n.4, 557 P.2d at 8 n.4 (emphasis added).
The extension of this duty to persons who merely handle evidence with the con-
sent of law enforcement officials, so that the state is held responsible for destruction
by a private person because he acted with police permission, goes farther than any
case cited by Wright.
89. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971), quoted in Wright,
87 Wn. 2d at 788, 557 P.2d at 5.
90. See People v. Norwood, 547 P.2d 273 (Colo. App. 1975) (cert. denied, Colo.
S. Ct. 1976). The Norwood decision purports to follow the holding in United States v.
Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1971), that failure to use earnest efforts to pre-
serve may result in sanctions. However, it rejects a claim that due process was vio-
lated by the state's "investigative negligence" in failing "to fingerprint and preserve
several items found at or near the scene of the shooting." 547 P.2d at 278-79. But
see notes 92-93 infra.
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evidence in order to prevent destruction by private persons. 91 A possi-
ble reason for Wright's extension of the duty to preserve to those who
handle evidence with law enforcement officials' consent is to prevent
avoidance of the duty to preserve by mere inaction on the part of such
officials. 92 It follows from Wright that if law enforcement officials
should have anticipated materiality, failure to prevent unauthorized
destruction by private persons should be excused only if the officials
made reasonable efforts to secure and protect the particular item.9 3
Allowing an excuse based upon reasonable efforts to protect, together
with the excuse for reasonable failure to recognize materiality,9 4 pre-
vents imposition of an unreasonable burden on the state.
3. Administrative inconvenience
Considering Wright's statement that "neither administrative conve-
nience nor inadequate facilities, where it is not shown facilities could
not be obtained, justifies a failure to preserve potential evidence,"9 5
91. The court in Wright ties the duty to preserve "all potentially material and
favorable evidence" to "an officer . . . at the scene of a crime." 87 Wn. 2d at 793,
557 P.2d at 7 (emphasis in original). If the court was concerned only with destruction
by the police, it could have referred only to the police generally.
Wright's counsel had moved prior to trial for "'an order dismissing the charge...
on the grounds that he has been denied due process of law in that the state has sup-
pressed material evidence by causing it to be destroyed and/or by allowing it to be
destroyed by private parties."' Id. at 786, 557 P.2d at 3 (quoting defendant's motion
to dismiss) (emphasis added).
92. Cf. Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 522 P.2d 681, 114 Cal. Rptr.
121 (1974) (defendant had a discovery right to pretrial lineup conducted by the police
when eyewitness identification was in material issue and a reasonable likelihood of a
mistaken identification existed which a lineup would tend to resolve). The Evans court
held that the lineup sought by the defense fell within the prosecution's duty to dis-
close material evidence favorable to the accused. Id. at 622, 522 P.2d at 684, 114 Cal.
Rptr. at 124. The court recognized a duty to acquire in stating:
[W] e are not concerned that the petitioner's motion for a pretrial lineup sought
the discovery of evidence not necessarily within the People's knowledge if within
the People's reach .... [T] he People cannot escape a responsibility to disclose
merely by passive conduct or the failure to acquire precise knowledge sought by
but unavailable to an accused.
Id. at 623-24, 522 P.2d at 685, 114 Cal. Rptr., 125.
93. See id. at 625-26, 522 P.2d at 686-87, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 126-27. The state's
duty to acquire lineup evidence was determined by considering not only benefits to
be derived by the accused and the reasonableness of his request but also the burden to
be imposed on the prosecution, the police, the court, and the witnesses. When the
police have the facilities and resources to acquire the evidence and the "procedure is
one which uniquely falls within police expertise and routine practices," the court judged
the burden to be "nominal." Id.
94. See Part III-C-1 supra.
95. 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7.
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the state would have to meet a severe burden in order to excuse non-
preservation on grounds of administrative inconvenience. Although a
very costly or time-consuming administrative burden might be said to
outweigh the values to be served by preservation,9 6 the Wright notice-
petition rule, by minimizing the burden of evidence maintenance,97
appears to preclude such an approach,9 8 unless the prosecution can
show that it was impossible to obtain the necessary facilities. 99
4. Substitutes for preservation
Failure to preserve material evidence may be excusable if the gov-
ernment has undertaken a reasonable substitute for preservation.1 00
When the prior existence of the object but not the object itself is im-
portant to the defense, court testimony that the object was found at
the scene may be sufficient.' 0 ' Whether photographs or testimony
96. See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cited in
Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7. Harrison arguably suggested a weighing
process, considering administrative burden along with other factors, though it held
that the "minimal burden" of retaining rough notes of witness interviews with FBI
agents "does not outweigh the significant values to be served by preservation." 524
F.2d at 429.
The Harrison court noted that "[a] dministrative convenience has traditionally fared
poorly as an asserted justification for government action infringing important rights
of individuals." Id. See cases cited id. at 429 n.20. See also note 93 supra.
97. 87 Wn. 2d at 792 n.5, 557 P.2d at 7 n.5.
98. But see People v. Vera, 62 Cal. App. 3d 293, 132 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1976). Vera
limits the prosecution's duty under People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 650, 527 P.2d
361, 368, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 16 (1974), to a duty to " 'undertake reasonable efforts to
preserve material evidence.' " 62 Cal. App. 3d at 300, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 823 (quoting
Hitch) (emphasis in Vera). One reason Vera gives for not requiring preservation of
latent fingerprints in place is that there was nothing in the record "as to the nature
and extent of the problems that would be faced by law enforcement agencies" if such
a duty were to be imposed. Id. at 300, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
99. Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7.
100. For example, in United States v. Shafer, 445 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971), the
court held that destruction of live fuses and gun powder which were material to
charges against the defendant did not warrant reversal because the live fuses and
cans of powder were photographed and the photographs, along with residue from the
detonated fuses and samples from each container of powder, were made available to
the defense. Id. at 581-82.
This is, in a sense, a variant of the materiality requirement; the Shafer court found
that the defendant had "pointed to no concrete area of prejudice due to disposition of
these articles." Id.
101. Governmental Loss, supra note 50, at 565, cited in Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at
792, 557 P.2d at 10.
For example, in State v. Haynes, 16 Wn. App. 778, 559 P.2d 583 (1977), the de-
fense sought confiscated marijuana in order to impeach the accuracy of a prosecution
witness's testimony. The marijuana had been destroyed by the police. The court held
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may be reasonable substitutes for actual preservation without use of
the notice-petition procedure should depend on the need asserted by
the defendant.
D. Extent of Defendants' Testing Rights
Two of the state's complaints against the Wright notice-petition
procedure involved its application to testing. The state claimed that
the Wright rule could require notice to a suspect or judicial approval
prior to "routine field investigation techniques [such] as dusting sur-
faces for fingerprints, or testing suspected narcotics or drugs with
'field test' kits to initially determine the presence or absence of unlaw-
ful substances." 102 The state also expressed the fear that notice or pe-
tition would be required prior to "the thousands of tests conducted in
crime laboratories even though the normal testing procedures would
neither destroy, consume or render the item of evidence incapable of
being subsequently tested.' 103 However, the Columbia Law Review
note-the apparent source of the requirement of notice or petition be-
fore testing-only suggests notice prior to tests which may be used as
evidence against the defendant and which may consume the substance
to be tested.'04 Thus, sanctions will not be applied unless the defense
shows a reasonable possibility that exculpatory evidence was de-
stroyed by the test. Destruction in testing would include a change in
the substance tested rendering it incapable of subsequent independent
tests. 105
that the destruction did not violate due process because the prosecutor offered to
stipulate where the marijuana was found, the police detective was cross-examined fully
on where it was found, and the defense counsel argued to the jury that the marijuana
must have impaired the witness's faculties. Id. at 789, 559 P.2d at 590-91.
In State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 464 P.2d 793 (1970), the police discarded a
used condom sought by the defendant to support his claim that he killed his stepfather
in self-defense after being found in bed with his mother. The court held that the de-
struction did not constitute suppression because "[t] he fact that the items were found,
and the time and place of their discovery, were testified to at the trial." 464 P.2d at
796.
102. Respondents Motion, supra note 6, at 8.
103. Id. at 10.
104. Testing, supra note 39, at 1378.
105. According to the amicus brief opposing deletion of the notice-petition rule,
the government must use the procedure "only when it wishes to be certain that its
contemplated test would not" result in sanctions for due process violation, and no
due process violation would be found unless the testing "threatens to destroy the
evidence or change its properties." Brief of Amicus Curiae Opposing Motion for Re-
consideration of Decision at 9.
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In addition, the Wright rule arguably imposes two requirements on
the prosecution: first, if tests are potentially destructive, the defense
must be allowed to participate in or observe the testing; second, if
tests can be rerun, the defense must be allowed to test independently.
The first requirement is proposed in the Columbia Law Review
note.10 6 A case cited in Wright'07 impliedly imposes the second re-
quirement, and the state has acknowledged such a duty to criminal
defendants.' 08
106. Because of the danger of errors in testing, the note asserts that when proof
of guilt hinges upon a test which uses up the substance tested so that none of it "re-
mains for independent evaluation," the defendant should be given the opportunity to
participate in or observe the original testing process. Testing, supra note 39. at 1374.
To provide for that opportunity is the clear purpose of the note's suggestion that
notice or petition be required before testing. Id. at 1378.
Compare the decisions of some other courts which have recognized a defense right
independently to test evidence, but have nevertheless held that due process is not vio-
lated by testing which exhausts the substance tested, even though the defendant was
given no opportunity for inspection and analysis. For example, the court in Lee v.
State, 511 P.2d 1076 (Alas. 1973), held that due process was not violated by admission
of test results without permitting independent expert analysis when state analysis had
exhausted the substance; the decision was distinguished in Lauderdale v. State, 548
P.2d 376, 382 (Alas. 1976) (see note 107 infra). Poole v. State, 291 So. 2d 723 (Miss.
1974), distinguished Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1970) (see note 107 infra),
and held that admission of evidence from a test which reasonably consumed all of
the substance tested did not violate due process.
107. People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 527 P.2d 361, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974). Wright
interprets Hitch as holding that due process requires preservation and disclosure of
"those parts of the Breathalyzer which may be profitably retested prior to trial," 87
Wn. 2d at 789, 557 P.2d at 5. For further authority for a right to independent testing,
see, e.g., Lauderdale v. State, 548 P.2d 376 (Alas. 1976) (suppressing breathalyzer test
where plausible evidence could have been derived from testing of ampoules destroyed
by the state); Jackson v. State, 243 So. 2d 396, 398 (Miss. 1970) (due process requires,
upon motion by the defendant, "that the analysis of the substance not be left totally
within the province of the state chemist").
A stronger reason for preservation in the breathalyzer cases is for possible impeach-
ment of the test's accuracy, People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 645 n.1, 527 P.2d at 364
n.l, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.l, because the test cannot be accurately rerun. Lauderdale
v. State, 548 P.2d at 379-80; Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d at 645 n.l, 527 P.2d at 364 n.1, 117
Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.1. See also State v. Bryan, 133 N.J. Super. 369, 336 A.2d 511, 513-
14 (1974) (impossibility of accurate retest is one reason for holding that destruction
of breathalyzer test ampoule does not violate due process).
108. In its brief requesting deletion of the notice-petition rule from Wright, the
state asserted that "later testing by the defendant's expert can be ordered" when the
test causes no physical change in the item tested and does not consume it. Respond-
ent's Motion, supra note 6, at 11.
The state cited WASH. CRIM. R. SUPER. CT. 4.7(a)(1)(iv), which requires the pro-
secutor to disclose "[a] ny reports or statements of experts made in connection with the
particular case, including results of ... scientific tests, experiments and comparisons,"
and WASH. CRIM. R. SUPER. CT. 3.1(f), which provides for appointment of necessary
defense experts if the defendant is financially unable to obtain them. Respondent's
Motion, supra at 11 n.1.
However, the author of the Columbia Law Review note claims that logic requires
that defendants rely on state tests when large quantities of the substance tested remain
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E. Choice of Sanctions
The choice of sanctions for violation of the Wright notice-petition
rule is not limited to automatic dismissal. The court stated, "The
range of sanctions available in suppression and destruction of evi-
dence cases should be broad and, of necessity, will be developed, over
time."' 0 9 The sanction applied will vary with the nature of the evi-
dence lost or destroyed and its degree of materiality. One commenta-
tor cited by the Wright court describes a range of sanctions including
"missing-evidence" jury instructions and suppression of government
evidence in addition to dismissal. 1 0 Dismissal might be required only
where a new trial would do nothing to remedy the constitutional vio-
lation, that is, where the evidence suppressed is necessary for a prima
facie case or where lost or destroyed evidence is potentially useful for
directly establishing the innocence of the defendant."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Contrary to prosecutorial arguments, the Wright notice-petition re-
quirement need not impose an unreasonable burden on the state. The
Wright rule is workable so long as a prerequisite to sanctions for its
violation is that the defense show a reasonable possibility that the evi-
intact, because "the court may always order retesting" as a check on accuracy. Test-
ing, supra note 39, at 1374.
109. 87 Wn. 2d at 792, 557 P.2d at 7.
110. Governmental Loss, supra note 50, at 564-65, cited in Wright, 87 Wn. 2d at
792, 557 P.2d at 7.
When the evidence is potentially relevant only for impeachment of a government
witness or of the results of scientific testing, suppression of the witness's testimony or
of the test results may suffice. Governmental Loss, supra note 50, at 564. See also
People v. Hitch, 12 Cal. 3d 641, 653-54, 527 P.2d 361, 370, 117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 18
(1974).
When the evidence is sufficiently material to an affirmative defense or to support
of the accused's general version of the occurrence, though not proving his innocence
directly, trial courts could be required "to instruct the jury that that particular aspect
of the defense's case must be taken as established fact." Governmental Loss, supra
note 50, at 564. But see City of Seattle v. Fettig, 10 Wn. App. 773, 519 P.2d 1002
(1974). Fettig reversed a conviction on the ground that destruction of evidence had
violated due process, but stated that the trial court had properly rejected the defend-
ants proposed jury instruction that the jury "'may infer that'" a destroyed video tape
"'would have corroborated the testimony of the defendant, and rebutted that of the
police officers, concerning the defendant's ability to perform sobriety tests .... 1 Id. at
776-77, 519 P.2d at 1005 (quoting defendant's proposed instruction No. 9). The court
said, "There is no rule of law or statute that requires a jury to presume that suppressed
evidence is favorable to the accused." Id. at 777, 519 P.2d at 1005.
I 11. See Governmental Loss, supra note 50, at 564.
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dence involved was material and favorable to the defendant. The
burden on the state is further minimized by the possibility that reason-
able failure to preserve will be excused. Future decisions regarding
post-Wright disposition or testing should clarify the existence and de-
gree of the materiality requirement; the conditions, if any, under
which failure to preserve material evidence can be excused; and the
extent of defense rights with respect to testing. Choice of sanctions
will necessarily depend on the application of a pragmatic balancing
approach in individual cases.
Maxine Stansell
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